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Clarence Goh 
Visiting Assistant Professor of Accounting (Practice)  




There is evidence to suggest that managers use CSR reporting as a means to 
manage their firms’ CSR reputations. In this study, I jointly examine CSR reputation 
and CSR crisis response in the context of CSR crises, and how they can influence 
investor judgments and decision making. In particular, in the context of CSR crises, I 
build on situational crisis communication theory to develop a CSR crisis response 
framework which managers can use to examine and understand how specific types 
of CSR crises can influence their firm’s CSR reputations, which can in turn influence 
investor judgments and decision making. Following from that, I also specify three 
CSR crisis response strategies that managers can employ to manage their firms’ 
CSR reputations. 
 




Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to the “actions that appear to further 
some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by the 
law (Huang and Watson, 2015).” The past decade has seen tremendous growth in 
CSR activities being undertaken by firms. As firms have devoted more resources to 
CSR activities, they have also engaged in more disclosure and reporting of these 
activities (Elliott et al., 2014). There is evidence to suggest that managers are using 
CSR reporting as a means to manage/enhance their CSR reputations (Clarke and 
Gibson-Sweet, 1999). A strong CSR reputation is beneficial to firms, especially when 
seen in the light of recent research in accounting which has generally found a 
positive association between a firm’s CSR reputation and investor judgments 
towards that firm (e.g. Elliott et al., 2014, Jizi et al., 2016, Rodgers et al., 2013). 
 
Given the extent research which has documented the growth of CSR activity and 
reporting, and which has examined CSR reputation and its important links to investor 
judgment and decision making, it is crucial for managers to better understand how to 
manage their firm’s CSR reputation, especially in relation to how it can influence 
investor judgment and decision making. Therefore, in this study, I jointly examine 
CSR reputation and CSR crisis response in the context of CSR crises - which have 
become an increasingly common occurrence in recent years (Paddison, 2015) – and 
how they can influence investor judgments and decision making. In particular, in the 
context of CSR crises, I build on situational crisis communication theory to develop a 
CSR crisis response framework which managers can use to examine and 
understand how specific types of CSR crises can influence their firm’s CSR 
reputations, and how this can in turn influence investor judgments and decision 
making. Following from that, I also specify three CSR crisis response strategies that 
managers can employ to manage/repair their firms’ CSR reputations.   
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The analysis in my study has important practical and theoretical implications. It is 
important for managers because it highlights a CSR crisis response framework and 
corresponding CSR response strategies which can guide them in managing their 
firms’ CSR reputations (in the eyes of investors) in the event of CSR crises. It is also 
informative for investors because it provides them with insights into how managers 
can develop and manage their firms’ CSR reputations, and how these CSR 
reputations can subsequently influence their judgments and decision making. This 
study also contributes to the accounting and CSR literature because is highlights a 
context where situational crisis communication theory is used to develop a CSR 
crisis communication framework to manage a firm’s CSR reputation in the eyes of 
investors. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the CSR 
responsibility of firms, section 3 develops the CSR crisis response framework, and 
section 4 concludes. 
 
2. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 
 
CSR has been defined in the literature as “actions that appear to further some social 
good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by the law (Huang 
and Watson, 2015).” In this respect, to the extent that firms do not exist in isolation 
but instead operate within the context of a society, they must accept that they bear a 
certain level of social responsibility. The literature specifies three views of CSR that 
firms could adopt in managing their CSR obligations to society – the economic view 
of CSR, the philanthropic view of CSR, and the social web view of CSR (Hartman et 
al., 2015). 
 
The economic view of CSR has its roots in utilitarianism, and holds that a business’ 
sole duty is to fulfil the economic functions that it was designed to serve.1 Here, the 
sole social responsibility that business managers have is to pursue profits within the 
confines of the law. Expounding on the economic view of CSR, Friedman (1970) 
highlighted that in fulfilling a corporation’s social responsibility, a business manager 
has only a responsibility to “conduct business in accordance with (his/her 
employer’s) desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible 
while conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those 
embodied in ethical custom.”  
 
The philanthropic view of CSR holds that a business is free to contribute to social 
causes as a matter of philanthropy, but is under no strict obligation to do so. A firm 
which subscribes to the philanthropic view of CSR contributes to social causes 
simply because it is the right thing to do and not because it is forced to do so. 
 
The social web view of CSR perceives firms as ‘citizens’ of the society in which they 
operate in. Like all other members of society, firms are hence also expected to abide 
by normal ethical norms and obligations. Under this view of CSR, pursuing profits 
are only one goal/responsibility that a firm has, and does not take precedence over 
other social responsibilities that it may hold.   
                                                            
1 Utilitarianism has often been called a consequentialist approach, and dictates that we should act in 
ways that produce better consequences than alternative we are considering (Hartman et al., 2015). 
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2.1. CSR REPORTING 
 
The last decade has seen firms increase their participation in CSR activities 
(Paddison, 2015). As part of this rapid growth, firms are increasingly also choosing to 
highlight their CSR activities by disclosing their CSR performance measures on their 
websites or annual reports (Elliott et al., 2014). A 2015 study by KPMG found that 
92% of the 250 largest firms in the world (G250) now report on their CSR activities. 
The growth of CSR reporting is not confined to the largest global firms but also 
extends to smaller companies spread across the world. In each of the regions 
examined in the study (Americas, Europe, Asia Pacific, and Middle East/Africa), 
more than 50% of the surveyed companies reported on their CSR activities (King 
and Bartels, 2015). There are also indications that the quality of CSR reporting is 
improving. For instance, King and Bartls (2015) also found that, in comparison to 
their 2013 study, there has been an increase in the proportion of G250 firms that (i) 
clearly define trends, (ii) clearly define risks, and (iii) clearly communicate their 
response to these risks in relation to reporting on their CSR activities. 
 
In addition, prior studies also provide evidence that despite an overall increase in the 
level and quality of CSR globally, there still exists a significant level of discrepancy in 
terms of the types of CSR reporting undertaken by firms in different parts of the 
world. In particular, in examining how CSR reporting is undertaken in USA, UK, 
Australia, and Germany, Chan and Bouvain (2009) found that “businesses from 
different countries vary significantly in the extent to which they promote CSR and the 
CSR issues that they choose to emphasize.”    
 
2.2. CSR REPUTATION 
 
A firm’s performance (and subsequent reporting) of CSR is closely linked to its 
overall corporate reputation. Fombrun and Shanley (1990) defined corporate 
reputation as “the perceived stakeholders’ opinion of a firm which depends on the 
extent to which the expectation of these stakeholders is met.” Providing a slightly 
different perspective, Fombrum (1996) defined corporate reputation as the 
“perceptual representation of a company’s past actions and future prospects that 
describe the firm’s overall appeal to all its key constituents when compared to other 
leading rivals’.” The reputation of a firm does not exist in isolation. Instead, a firm’s 
reputation is often benchmarked against the reputation of its peers. Consistent with 
these findings, Bertels and Peloza (2008) suggest that a firm’s reputation is 
composed of both its own actions and the status of those actions relative to the 
actions of others. Given the extend findings in the literature, it is unsurprising that 
corporate reputation has often been described as a valuable asset to a company, 
and one of the biggest competitive advantages that a company can have (Soppe et 
al., 2011).  
 
Prior studies (e.g., Brammer and Pavelin, 2004; Mahon and Wartick, 2003) have 
established that a firm’s performance (and reporting) of CSR influences corporate 
reputation. Fryxell and Wang (1994) examined firms on the Fortune Corporate 
‘Reputation’ index and found that firms which were judged to have performed better 
at CSR were also found to have had better overall firm reputations. At the same 
time, Schnietz and Epstein (2005) also suggest that social responsibility is a key 
dimension of corporate reputation. While there is no single ‘correct’ set of criteria that 
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defines CSR reputation, Lewis (2001) suggests that a firm’s CSR reputation 
comprises of the following components: environmental impact, treatment of 
employees, financial performance, product quality, quality of management or 
organizational issues, customer service, and social responsibility.   
 
Earlier studies have also identified the management of firm CSR reputation as a key 
motivation for firms when they choose to make CSR disclosures. Sirsly and Lvina 
(2016) suggest that managers can create competitive advantages for their firms over 
competitor firms by “investing in doing good to reap the benefits of looking good and 
looking even better with time.” Consistent with the notion that firms choose to make 
CSR disclosure in order to manage their CSR reputations, Clarke and Gibson-Sweet 
(1999) examined 100 large companies in the United Kingdom and found that those 
companies that had a larger public presence were more likely to capitalise on their 
investments in CSR by highlighting them in their annual reports than companies that 
had a smaller public presence.   
 
2.3. CSR REPUTATION AND INVESTOR JUDGMENTS 
 
As firms increasingly participate in more CSR activities and publicly disclose more 
information about their CSR programs, investors now routinely consider a firm’s CSR 
reputation, in combination with traditional financial performance measures, when 
making investment decisions (Elliott et al. 2014).  For instance, a recent survey of 
investors and analysts in 18 European countries by the Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (ACCA) and Eurosif found that CSR reports were the most 
important source of non-financial information that these group of stakeholders used 
in making investment decisions. In all, 89% of respondents in the survey felt that 
CSR reports were ‘essential’ or of ‘high importance’ when making investment 
decisions (ACCA and Eurosif, 2013). 
 
In general, the academic literature has also documented a positive relationship 
between a firm’s CSR reputation and investor judgments. For example, Jizi et al. 
(2016) examined the effects of CSR reporting by commercial banks in the US on 
their stock price, and document a positive relationship between a bank’s CSR 
reporting and stock price. Consistent with the notion that more CSR reporting leads 
to better CSR reputation, which in turn leads to a positive influence on investors, 
Rodgers et al. (2013) examined how investors respond to firms’ commitment to CSR 
and found a positive link between a firm’s CSR reputation and its firm value 
(represented by stock price). Their study suggests that, in general, investors 
perceive a firm’s CSR efforts positively when making investment decisions.2   
 
Therefore, the extent literature suggests that, in addition to traditional accounting 
measures, CSR reporting represents an important area which managers and 
accountants should pay attention to when managing the disclosures that their firms 
make. In particular, CSR reporting represents an important source of non-financial 
disclosure which investors rely on to help them make investment decisions. In 
particular, CSR reporting is an important tool which managers can use to enhance 
                                                            
2 This is also consistent with Hughey and Sulkowski (2012) who find that when more data about firms’ 
CSR activities is available, it leads to better CSR reputations for these firms (within the oil and gas 
industry). 
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their firms’ CSR reputations, and in doing so, positively influence investors when 
they make investment decisions.    
 
3. DEVELOPING A CSR CRISIS RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
3.1. CSR CRISES 
 
Certainly, firms are increasingly expanding large amounts of resources on CSR 
activities and reporting in order to build up their reputations for good CSR practices 
(Guerrera and Birchall, 2008). At the same time, however, even as firms try to build 
up their CSR reputations, they may sometimes find themselves unexpectedly 
embroiled in CSR crisis situations that can severely undermine their previous CSR 
efforts (and reputations). Many prior studies have defined a crisis to be an episode 
which represents a threat to reputational assets (e.g., Barton, 2001). Some 
examples of firms with strong CSR reputations that have found themselves having to 
manage unexpected CSR crises include BP when it was involved in an oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico in 2010 (Griffin, 2015) and Ikea which was recently found to have 
used prison labour in the 1970s and 1980s (Connolly, 2012).  
 
CSR crises are often sudden and unexpected events. A CSR crisis can damage a 
firm’s CSR reputation among investors because it gives them reason to think badly 
about the firm (Coombs, 2007). In particular, CSR crises can negatively affect how 
investors interact with affected firms, and can have severe impacts on these firms. 
For instance, even one year after the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, BP’s market 
capitalization still remained at a level that was $49 billion lower than its pre-oil spill 
level (Moreano, 2011).   
 
When such CSR crises occur, firms often seek to rely on their prior CSR reputations 
to guide them through the negative episode. In this respect, the literature has 
examined the ‘halo’ effect of reputation, where a firm’s favourable pre-crisis 
reputation shields/protects it from damage during a CSR crisis (Coombs and 
Holladay, 2005). The ‘halo’ effect also suggests that a firm’s favourable pre-crisis 
reputation functions as something similar to a bank account containing reputational 
capital which it can afford to lose during a crisis and still emerge with a favourable 
post-crisis reputation (Alsop, 2004). 
 
However, recent findings in the communication literature also suggest that firms 
cannot depend solely on the ‘halo’ effect to get them through CSR crises. Instead, 
research suggests that the effects of a CSR crisis on a firm’s CSR reputation are 
jointly influenced by both its CSR reputation and crisis response strategy. 
 
3.2. SITUATIONAL CRISIS COMMUNICATION THEORY AND THE CSR CRISIS 
RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
 
In developing a crisis response framework to guide a firm in developing its crisis 
response strategy, I rely on the principles specified in situational crisis 
communication theory (SCCT; Coombs, 2007). SCCT is informed by attribution 
theory which suggests that people are inclined to search for the cause of events (i.e. 
make attributions), especially for events which are negative and/or unexpected 
(Weiner, 2006). When a negative and/or unexpected event occurs, a person will 
seek to make attributions about responsibility for the event, and experiences a 
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corresponding emotional response to the event arising from his/her attribution of 
responsibility. These attributions of responsibility and the subsequent emotional 
responses can serve as motivations for a person to act/respond. Such behavioural 
responses are likely to be negative when a target person/entity is judged to be 
responsible (for the negative/unexpected event) and the emotional response of 
anger is evoked. In contrast, behavioural responses are likely to be positive when a 
target person/entity is judged not to be responsible (for the negative/unexpected 
event) and the emotional response of sympathy is evoked.  
 
SCCT builds upon attribution theory to predict how investors of a company are likely 
to act during a CSR crisis. In a CSR crisis situation, the CSR crisis represents the 
negative/unexpected event which prompts investors to assess crisis responsibility. If 
investors assess that the firm is responsible for the CSR crisis, the emotional 
response of anger is evoked, and the company’s CSR reputation suffers in the eyes 
of investors. On the other hand, if investors assess that the firm is not responsible for 
the CSR crisis (perhaps because the crisis occurred due to external/unforeseen 
circumstances outside the control of the firm), the emotion of sympathy for the firm is 
evoked, and the company’s reputation remains intact in the eyes of investors.         
 
Therefore, SCCT suggests that in developing a robust CSR response framework, 
managers must first understand the nature of the CSR crisis that they are faced with, 
and how the crisis might represent a threat to the CSR reputation of their firms. Prior 
research suggests three pertinent factors to consider when examining the 
reputational threat to firms during CSR crisis situations: (1) initial crisis responsibility, 
(2) crisis history, and (3) prior relational reputation (Coombs, 2007).  
 
To a large extent, investors’ attribution of initial crisis responsibility is influenced by 
their perceptions of the level of personal control that firms had in regard to the CSR 
crisis. If investors perceive that the firm had control over events leading to the CSR 
crisis, they would be more likely to attribute responsibility for the crisis to the firm 
than if they had perceived that the firm did not have control over events leading to 
the crisis (Coombs, 1995). Crisis history relates to the extent to which a firm has 
experienced a similar CSR crisis previously. Consistent with attribution theory, a firm 
with a history of similar CSR crises would suggest to stakeholders that the firm has 
an ongoing issue that needs to be addressed (but which has not yet been 
addressed; Martinko et al., 2004). Consequently, it is likely that investors would be 
more likely to attribute responsibility for a CSR crisis to a firm that has a history of 
similar crises than one which does not have such a history. Lastly, prior relational 
reputation relates to how well (or badly) a firm has (or is perceived to have) treated 
its investors (or other stakeholders) in other contexts. A firm that has a negative 
relational reputation would be seen as one which shows no consideration for 
stakeholders (including investors) across a variety of contexts (including in the event 
of a CSR crisis).  
 
Figure 1 presents how managers can assess the reputational threat that CSR crises 
can have on their firms. When a CSR crisis occurs, SCCT dictates that investors will 
make attributions as to the party that is responsible for the crisis (link 1). At the same 
time, investors will also examine the firm’s crisis history and prior relationship 
reputation, which function as intensifying factors in the attribution of crisis 
responsibility. A firm that has a (no) history of similar crises would see its crisis 
Accountancy Business and the Public Interest 2018 
170 
 
responsibility enhanced (diminished) in the eyes of investors while a firm which has a 
bad (good) prior relationship reputation would see its crisis responsibility enhanced 
(diminished) in the eyes of investors in the event of a CSR crisis. Hence, the overall 
high (low) level of responsibility that investors attribute to the firm (based on their 
evaluations of crisis responsibility and the two intensifying factors) for the crisis will 
lead to a corresponding decrease (maintenance) of the firm’s CSR reputation in the 
eyes of stakeholders (link 4). Finally, the change in their perceptions of the firm’s 
CSR reputations would directly influence their behaviour intentions (i.e. investment 
judgments) towards the firm (link 5). 
 














3.3. CSR CRISIS RESPONSE STRATEGIES 
 
Having examined how CSR crises can influence the investment judgments of 
investors, managers can then leverage on the CSR crisis response framework to 
develop appropriate response strategies to repair/manage their firms’ CSR 
reputations in order to prevent potential negative outcomes. Crisis response 
strategies involve the things that managers do or say after a crisis (Coombs, 2007), 
and has been widely studied in both the management (Bradford and Garrett, 1995, 
Marcus and Goodman, 1991) and communications fields (Benoit, 1995, Allen and 
Caillouet, 1994).  
 
There are three main types of crisis response strategies that firms can undertake 
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three strategies exist on a continuum, reflecting the extent to which the firm 
accepts/denies responsibility for a CSR crisis. Specifically, a denial strategy exists 
on one end of the continuum and reflects that the firm denies any responsibility for 
the CSR crisis while a rebuild strategy exists on the opposite end of the continuum 
and reflects that the firm accepts responsibility for the crisis. Figure 2 provides a 
visual representation of how these three crisis response strategies are positioned on 
the continuum. 
 






Crisis communication strategies can influence an investor’s perceptions (of both the 
crisis and the firm) during a crisis. In turn, these perceptions will shape his/her 
evaluations of the firm’s CSR reputation which can influence his/her investment 
judgments. Managers can adopt specific crisis communication strategies to 
protect/repair his/her firm’s CSR reputation. Specifically, crisis communication 
strategies have three main roles in protecting/repairing a firm’s CSR reputation: (1) 
shape attributions of the crisis, (2) change perceptions of the firm in crisis, and (3) 
reduce the negative effects generated by the crisis (Coombs, 1995).  
 
Deny strategies endeavour to remove any responsibility that a firm may have for the 
CSR crisis. Consequently, if the firm is in no way responsible for the crisis, it will not 
suffer any (CSR) reputational damage from the event in the eyes of investors. 
However, if investors reject the firm’s assertion that they were not responsible for the 
CSR crisis and instead continue to attribute responsibility for the CSR crisis to the 
firm, the deny strategy could aggravate the damage to the firm’s CSR reputation 
because it could give the impression that the firm is trying to shriek its responsibility. 
Diminish strategies exist towards the centre of the continuum, and seek to put 
forward the case the CSR crisis is not as bad as people think or that the firm did not 
lack control over events leading to the crisis. In using diminished strategies, 
managers try to reduce the perceived link between the CSR crisis and the firm’s 
responsibility (while still accepting a certain level of responsibility for the CSR crisis).  
 
Rebuild strategies allow firms to generate new reputational assets. They seek to 
improve a firm’s CSR reputation by offering material and/or symbolic form of aid to 
stakeholders affected by the crisis. Here, managers proactively say and do things to 
benefit the stakeholder, and take positive actions in the hope of offsetting the 
negative effects of crisis on its CSR reputation in the eyes of investors. Rebuild 
strategies are appropriate for CSR crisis situations where there is a severe 
reputational threat which the firm is responsible for, and where the firm also has a 
crisis history and/or a negative prior relationship reputation (Coombs, 2007). 
 
Denial Diminish Rebuild 
Firm accepts full responsibility Firm does not accept any responsibility 
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Therefore, in managing the negative impacts of a CSR crisis on its CSR reputation, 
managers need to understand the various links through which a CSR crisis can 
impact its CSR reputation and eventually lead to potential negative behaviour 
intentions among investors. It is only by fully understanding this, within the context of 
the CSR crisis that it is experiencing, can a manager select a suitable crisis 





This study examined how, in the context of CSR crises, a firm can use various CSR 
crisis response strategies to manage its CSR reputation, which can influence 
investor judgments and decision making. In particular, it leveraged on situational 
crisis communication theory to develop a CSR crisis communication framework 
which managers could use to manage/repair their firms’ CSR reputations using three 
CSR crisis response strategies in the event of CSR crises.  
 
The analysis in the study is important because it highlights a CSR crisis response 
framework and proposes relevant CSR response strategies which managers can 
employ to manage/protect their firms’ CSR reputations in the event of CSR crises. At 
the same time, the study also allows managers to better understand how firms can 
actively cultivate their CSR reputations, and how these CSR reputations can have an 
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